An active troll network on X is being used to increase the visibility of accounts that publish covert propaganda in a digital operation linked to Mippci.
A network of more than 50 troll accounts is active on X, amplifying content originally published by *Dracarys*, an anonymous and inauthentic covert propaganda account — recently suspended — that was operated by officials from the General Directorate of Digital Media of the Ministry of People’s Power for Communication and Information (Mippci). This network is part of a covert information operation linked to that ministry, aimed at disseminating pro-government propaganda on the social media platform X, which has been blocked in Venezuela since August 2024 by order of Nicolás Maduro himself.
The investigation found that the troll network was made up of more than 95 accounts, but as of November 14 several dozen had been suspended by the platform’s proactive anti-manipulation system. Despite these suspensions, its operators regularly create new accounts to replace them and keep the fake-account network active.
Unlike automated bots or bot-like accounts — which usually generate large volumes of spam — these anonymous accounts mimic organic behavior by posing as real users, even though they are inauthentic.
A network of accounts used to amplify covert state propaganda
The network of fake accounts was detected by analyzing how content attributed to Dracarys is amplified in a coordinated way. Dracarys is an anonymous account — recently suspended — that used the silhouette of a dragon surrounded by red flames as its avatar (username @UnleashDracarys, X ID 1377855572884795392). In a previous investigation, Dracarys’s operation was linked to officials from the General Directorate of Digital Media at Mippci, the same ministry behind the blocking of the social network X in Venezuela.
The analysis of that amplification made it possible to identify a structure of inauthentic accounts that are replicating, quoting and replying in a coordinated manner to posts related to Dracarys. The strategy not only seeks to influence public conversation on social media by amplifying coordinated propaganda campaigns? operations?, but also to artificially inflate the popularity, reach and perceived relevance of Dracarys’s content on X, given part of the attention it receives comes from this network of fake accounts.
All the identified accounts focus their activity on boosting Dracarys’s content and promoting pro-Maduro propaganda hashtags and messages through the recurrent use of the hashtag #UnleashDracarys. The accounts also frequently share videos and opinion columns attributed to Dracarys on “unofficial” propaganda outlets.
After tracking these accounts, two distinct generations of inauthentic accounts were revealed: around 35 accounts created between April and July 2025 — almost all suspended by X — and more than 60 accounts created between August and November 2025, 50 of which remained active at the time this article was published.
The operation shows a pattern of persistence: its operators tend to create new accounts to replace those that have been suspended.
Amplification of covert propaganda hashtags linked to Mippci
The use of the hashtag #UnleashDracarys is a recurring pattern amongst this network’s accounts. The hashtag is used in association with the information operation linked to Mippci and with “unofficial” hashtag campaigns pushed by officials from that ministry.
This marker’s recurrence in accounts with similar characteristics made it easier to identify and track the joint activity of the inauthentic account network.
The accounts have very few original posts and focus their activity on reposting content from Dracarys and other accounts that amplify pro-government narratives and interact with one another. Some of them include “@LoQSeDic” (X ID 839299289792774144), the former official account of the Ministry of Communication and Information (@Mippcivzla) — which now presents itself as a news aggregator — accounts connected to Escuela Influye — the “influencer school” attached to Mippci — and “unofficial” propaganda outlets such as Venezuela News and Extra News Mundo.
When these accounts do post original content, it is usually generic messages such as motivational quotes, sports comments or everyday topics.
This tactic, often referred to as “spamouflage,” seeks to camouflage their propagandistic nature. By interspersing apolitical messages among propaganda reposts, the operators try to evade the detection of coordinated behavior both by the platform’s automated systems and by users.
Multiple patterns that reveal inauthenticity
By reviewing and analyzing the accounts, we identified recurring patterns of inauthenticity, including the types of avatars used, the absence of information in bios, follower–following counts, and the structure of usernames, among others.
These clues show that the accounts were designed by the same person or by the same group of people in a coordinated way. They are accounts that appear to belong to real users but, in reality, do not have solid or legitimate digital identities.
For example, the accounts use photos that avoid showing verifiable identities. Among the most common images are natural landscapes, flowers, images with motivational phrases, photos of women where the full face is not shown or is partially hidden, black-and-white images of silhouettes or hands, drawings, or anime characters.
Of the 50 accounts currently active, 16 use images of women whose faces are not visible as their avatars. All of them portray women seen from behind with long black hair, or faces taken from low angles that prevent full facial features from being seen.
The analysis also revealed cases of exact duplication: the accounts @EstefanyGa90152 and @MaryuryMar2 share the same profile photo. Two other accounts, @VelasquezM4306 and @EstefanyGa90152, use the same header image featuring a sunflower field.
The usernames do not correspond to identifiable people nor suggest real identities. The accounts avoid using recognizable full names, references, or specific locations that would make it possible to verify the existence of the person behind the accounts.
For example: @hinataOOP presents itself only as “Hinata”, @LoquitaCxc as “Loquita”, @BbkMaida as “Maida”, @JeanHHSS as “Jean”, and @LunaaRTYY as “Lunaa”. These accounts illustrate another predominant pattern: using nicknames, first names without surnames, or random alphanumeric combinations, always devoid of additional information that could link them to real people.
Most accounts have completely empty bios. Those that do include text use motivational phrases, generic quotes, or vague descriptions, with no specific personal information. They do not mention locations, professions, particular interests, or details that typically characterize the bios of genuine users.
The accounts keep a low number of followers and followings that generally do not exceed 20 in each category. Despite this small audience, the accounts regularly post and repost content from Dracarys, generating daily activity focused exclusively on amplifying its content.
This pattern is illustrated by the account @JesusMadri90644, identified as “Jesús Díaz Madrid”, created on September 22, 2025. This account had just two followers: the suspended Dracarys account and @LoQSeDic, the former official Mippci account that changed its name. In addition, the accounts show no original posts, only 68 reposts consisting exclusively of content from Dracarys and other “unofficial” propaganda accounts, such as Agencia Venezuela News and Extra News Mundo.
All of these patterns reinforce the instrumental nature of the accounts: they exist to amplify content, not to represent individuals with their own histories or identities. The patterns show an inauthentic use of this group of accounts, in violation of X’s authenticity rules.
Extension of an electoral disinformation troll network
The troll network described above was detected in 2025 and is linked to another group of accounts involved in a disinformation case reported a few days before the presidential elections of July 28, 2024.
On July 19, 2024, Jorge Rodríguez — president of the National Assembly, campaign chief for Nicolás Maduro, and minister of communication prior to Freddy Ñáñez — presented, in a press conference, hate messages posted on X by accounts of alleged Venezuelan opposition supporters, calling for attacks against chavistas if the July 28 presidential election was won by the opposition candidate. Two days after his appearance, Cazadores de Fake News published a report explaining that the accounts that generated the hate messages were part of a false-flag disinformation operation and were connected to Maduro’s campaign.
In response, the director of Digital Media at Mippci, Dayra Rivas, used the account @PiensaIA (which later changed its name to @UnleashDracarys, the currently suspended account “Dracarys”) to discredit Cazadores de Fake News’ investigation in several posts. Her responses were quickly boosted by dozens of accounts with inauthenticity patterns similar to the more than 95 troll accounts that interacted with Dracarys’s content in 2025.
These are not two isolated troll networks: the structure active in 2025 is a continuation of the one that operated in 2024, whose accounts were almost all gradually suspended.
In both instances, the same officials from Mippci’s Digital Media Directorate resorted to the same technique: using fake accounts that pretend to be ordinary users. In 2024, these officials used fake X accounts to endorse Nicolás Maduro and spread electoral disinformation, and in 2025 they repeated the same technique to amplify covert propaganda and disinformation on the same platform — with the difference that the social media is now blocked in Venezuela by decision of the government itself.
The repeated use of fake-account networks shows that these are not independent actions, but a long-term strategy. Its patterns allow researchers of Venezuelan government disinformation to continue tracking the evolution of the troll network, documenting its continued presence on the platform, and attributing its operation precisely to the same governmental actor.
***Journalism in Venezuela is practiced in a hostile environment for the press, with dozens of legal instruments designed to punish speech — particularly the laws “against hatred,” “against fascism,” and “against the blockade.” This content was produced by journalists working inside Venezuela and is being published with careful consideration of the threats and restrictions that, as a result, have been imposed on the dissemination of information from within the country.
Cazadores de Fake News investiga a detalle cada caso, mediante la búsqueda y el hallazgo de evidencias forenses digitales en fuentes abiertas. En algunos casos, se usan datos no disponibles en fuentes abiertas con el objetivo de reorientar las investigaciones o recolectar más evidencias.
